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“Truth” has been used as a baseline condition in several functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies of deception. However, like deception, telling the truth is an
inherently social construct, which requires consideration of another person’s mental
state, a phenomenon known as Theory of Mind. Using a novel ecological paradigm,
we examined blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses during social and
simple truth telling. Participants (n = 27) were randomly divided into two competing
teams. Post-competition, each participant was scanned while evaluating performances
from in-group and out-group members. Participants were asked to be honest and were
told that their evaluations would be made public. We found increased BOLD responses
in the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral anterior insula and precuneus when participants
were asked to tell social truths compared to simple truths about another person. At the
behavioral level, participants were slower at responding to social compared to simple
questions about another person. These findings suggest that telling the truth is a nuanced
cognitive operation that is dependent on the degree of mentalizing. Importantly, we show
that the cortical regions engaged by truth telling show a distinct pattern when the task
requires social reasoning.
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INTRODUCTION
Telling the truth is not a simple cognitive task. Honesty requires assessment of individual
social situations and, in particular, consideration of another person’s mental state, a
phenomenon known as Theory of Mind (Frith, 2007). Honesty about another person,
in particular (and especially being brutally honest about that person), sometimes also
requires us to put ourselves in that person’s shoes, and to emotionally regulate ourselves
accordingly—to empathize, in other words (Decety and Jackson, 2004; Krämer et al.,
2010). Thus, certain social situations make honesty particularly challenging: confessions of
wrongdoing (Hilgendorf and Irving, 1981; Deslauriers-Varin et al., 2011), difficult medical
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diagnoses (Buckman, 1984; Fallowfield and Jenkins, 2004; Shaw
et al., 2013), and statements that contradict dominant ideological
or political points of view (Brounéus, 2010). Anecdotally, these
situations can cause us to blush, experience increased respiration,
or feel our hearts beating more rapidly. The scale and scope of
truth telling can be as simple as responding “yes” or “no” to a
simple question, or as complex as admitting guilt in a criminal-
legal situation. Furthermore, personal and cultural norms play a
role in definitions of truth: valances attached to being honest are
very different for different people and in different social situations
(Bok, 1999; Zahedi, 2011). Thus, not only the definition of what
a truth is, but also the experience of being asked to tell the
truth, as well as the cognitive load of that telling, are very often
mediated by social contexts: in short, humans assess complex
social situations when faced with telling the truth (Sip et al.,
2013).
However, despite this social contingency, cognitive
neuroscience studies often consider “truth” to be a clearly
defined control condition. For example, some notable prior
studies on neurobiological and cognitive components of
deception attempted to control for social context(s), and in so
doing, have taken truth conditions to be neutral baselines that
can used to control for deceptive responses. Studies with more
nuanced designs assumed truth as a baseline, in part, because
it was not a variable of interest (Langleben et al., 2005; Bhatt
et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010); other studies disaggregated truth
conditions from deception conditions on the basis that truth
is a less active condition than deception (Spence et al., 2001,
2004; Langleben et al., 2002; Kozel et al., 2004; Debey et al.,
2012; Ito et al., 2012; Vartanian et al., 2012). With few exceptions
(Mohamed et al., 2006; Marques et al., 2009; Verschuere et al.,
2010; Hadar et al., 2012), truth telling has not been studied
as a socially complex variable in recent fMRI studies. Indeed,
one recent study characterizes its “truth/truth telling state” as
“inactive” (Hu et al., 2012: 6). While researchers have begun to
treat deception within “a framework of social decision-making
(see e.g., Abe et al., 2007; Barrios et al., 2008; Baumgartner et al.,
2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Bhatt et al., 2010; Carrión et al.,
2010; Sip et al., 2010)” (Sip et al., 2012), the same cannot yet
be said of truth telling. Yet, truth telling appears to meet Sip
et al.’s (2012) criteria for a “complex social interaction”—in
other words, it “involves a broad set of cognitive processes,
including the ability (i) to determine the possible courses of
action and to identify how they could be coordinated with the
interlocutor, (ii) to weigh these available courses of action against
one another, and (iii) to choose which action to perform next in
the interaction” (Sip et al., 2012).
Our study began with two hypotheses: (1) we hypothesized
that being asked to tell the truth engages areas of the brain that
have previously been associated with mentalizing, specifically
the medial prefrontal cortex (Amodio and Frith, 2006) and the
insular cortex (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012), but only when truth
telling required social reasoning compared to factual reasoning.
This was based on the hypothesis that telling the truth in a social
context requires predicting the mental point of view of another
person and empathizing in terms of predicting the feelings of
that person; (2) we hypothesized that these processes would be
pronounced when telling the truth about in-group compared to
out-group members. Hypothesis (1) was confirmed; hypothesis
(2) was not confirmed.
To test these hypotheses, we examined BOLD responses
during truth telling that required complex social, inter-
personal calculation, compared to truth telling about simple
and impersonal physical attributes. The study design consisted
of an ecological experiment that allowed us to create a
realistic, yet controlled social situation among the participants.
The experiment took place over 3 days. During this period,
participants established team identities by competing against
one another as members of two distinct choir-teams. After
the competition, participants evaluated each other’s singing
performances in the MRI scanner. Crucially, participants
believed that their evaluations would become public at a reunion
luncheon, and were asked to “be honest” in their evaluations
of fellow participants who had performed poorly. However, the
only people who were actually evaluated were four actors, two
men, and two women on each team. Participants were not
informed that there were actors among them, and the actors
were instructed to play the role of a participant without revealing
their identities as actors. Further, the actors were instructed to be
very likable, but to sing very poorly. Participants reported strong
team-identification throughout the first day of the experiment.
During a post-scan debriefing, nearly all participants were
conscious of their answers and their revelation at the reunion
luncheon. All participants believed that they were evaluating
fellow participants.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-seven healthy volunteers (21 females) aged 20–35 were
recruited from local choirs in and around Aarhus, Denmark.
We chose to recruit choir singers as participants for the study
for two reasons: first, choir singing involves people’s ability
to perform individually within a collective, that is, individual
singers must adjust their own voice to fit a group performance
while simultaneously assessing the performance of their fellow
singers. Second, as the study took place in Aarhus, Denmark,
which is home to many different choirs, we found that choir
singing adapted well to the social and cultural setting of the
experiment. All participants completed “Day 1” of the study
involving team-building. Three participants were excluded due to
metal implants and one for anxiety. The remaining 23 volunteers
(5 male, 18 female) participated in “Day 2” and fMRI scanning.
Participants provided written informed consent as approved
by the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Institutional
Review Board (#10084) and the Ethics Committee of the Central
Denmark Region.
Procedure
The experiment included two parts that were inseparable: Day
1 consisted of an 8-h team-building behavioral experiment. Day
2 consisted of a 1-h fMRI session. Participants were led to
believe that there would also be a Day 3 at a future date, in
which all participants would be reunited with one another, their
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evaluations of each others performances would be revealed, and
a winning team would be chosen.
Day 1:
• Participants arrived together at the Department of Music
at Aarhus University, Denmark, at 10:00 am. They gave
written informed consent and were administered a Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Measure (HADS) (Zigmond and
Snaith, 1983). All participants passed the HADS and were
approved by the on-team clinical psychologist (Tonks) for
the experiment. The HADS measure ensured that our sample
population was normal, healthy, and able to participate
in a paradigm that was designed to create experimental
stress.
• Participants were then broken into two teams with equal
proportions of males and females on each team. The
experimenters chose teams in a random-seeming manner,
but allocated one female and one male actor to each team.
Participants remained unaware throughout that the actors
were not normal participants.
• Participants each received a colored bandana (blue or purple)
to identify their team.
• Each team retired to a separate room for a team-building
exercise (i.e., the “Tree of Life”), which allowed participants
to share personal narratives about their backgrounds, present
circumstances, and future goals, before returning to a common
room for lunch, where the teams sat separately.
• Both teams competed in a team-based quiz game concerning
various music-related questions. Participants were told that
the results would be counted toward the team competition,
which would be announced during the “Day 3” reunion.
• Each team then met their respective choir coaches and, in
separate rooms, practiced one song to be sung competitively.
• Participants (including the actors) were individually removed
from the group to film a 1-min singing video. Although
no video footage of the participants was actually recorded
(aside from that of the actors, who were aware of the
deception), all participants were informed that other
participants from both teams would view these videos before
the fMRI scan on Day 2, and that a randomly-chosen video
would be the basis of each participant’s fMRI evaluation
task.
• Teams came together for the final competition, which was
judged by a well-known choir director from Aarhus; results
were not provided, but participants were told that the scores
would count toward the larger, team competition.
• Teams went to dinner at separate restaurants to further bond.
Day 2:
• Participants arrived individually for the fMRI experiment
at the Aarhus University Hospital and gave their informed
written consent.
• Participants were led to believe that they were drawing names
at random from a hat (in fact, the hat was rigged).
• Participants all viewed the same four videos of the likable, yet
poorly-singing actors (two from each team, one female and
one male).
• Participants were asked to be as honest as possible in their
evaluations of the singers, but also reminded that their
evaluations would be made public at the reunion lunch on
“Day 3.”
Experimental Paradigm
The fMRI paradigm comprised a 2 × 2 factorial design with
the following conditions: Social Truth-Ingroup, Social Truth-
Outgroup, Simple Truth-Ingroup, Simple Truth-Outgroup. Each
condition comprised an epoch that started with a picture of the
fellow participant followed by a question about her or him. A
fixation cross was displayed between faces and questions with
variable duration to induce a jittered inter-stimulus interval and
increase design efficiency (Figure 1). A social question was one
that requested a subjective and evaluative opinion about the
participant, e.g., “is Person X a poor singer?” A simple question
did not require reasoning about the person beyond his or her
physical appearance and did not put the participant’s social
relationships at stake for the formulation of a truthful response,
e.g., “does Person X have brown hair?” The social and simple
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm.
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questions were formulated and validated in a separate pilot
study in which 18 college-aged participants rated 40 possible
questions on a social stressfulness scale from 1–5. Each scan
lasted 20min and comprised a total of 80 randomized epochs.
The subjects were required to answer “yes” with their right-
hand index finger or “no” with their middle finger. Note that
the answers were deliberately subjective and hence we took
no measure of the accuracy of evaluations (a limitation that
we discuss further below). The prediction that participants
would give genuine or authentic responses responses was highly
dependent on the ecological validity of the experimental situation
that we had created. After the fMRI session, we revealed all
deceptive elements of the experiment to the participants during
a de-brief.
fMRI Acquisition
Functional images were acquired on a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio
MRI Scanner (Erlangen, Germany) using a 32 channel RF head-
coil. T2∗-weighted echo planar images (EPI) consisting of 43
slices of 3mm thickness per volume were acquired in interleaved
fashion with the following parameters: repetition time (TR) =
2.14 s, echo time (TE) = 27ms, flip angle = 90◦, field of view
(FOV) = 192 × 192mm, and in-plane resolution = 64 × 64.
Soft cushions were used tominimize headmovements. In parallel
with EPI time-series, the participants’ pulse and respiration were
recorded using infrared pulse oximetry on the index finger and a
pneumatic thoracic belt (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany).
fMRI Data Analysis
Single-subject Analysis
fMRI data analysis was performed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM8, revision 4667). The functional images of each
subject were realigned (Friston et al., 1995a), spatially normalized
to MNI space using the EPI template (Ashburner and Friston,
1999), and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8mm FWHM.
The time-series in each voxel was high-pass filtered at 128 s using
a discrete cosine set to remove low-frequency drifts. Statistical
analysis was implemented using a general linear model (Friston
et al., 1995b). Regressors encoding the experimental design were
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function and
fitted to the fMRI time-series. This also included a partition
of no interest explaining the mere effects of visual stimuli and
motor responses related to the button press. Serial correlations
due to physiological noise were modeled using Nuisance
Variable Regression (Lund et al., 2006), an alternative to the
standard first-order autoregressive AR(1) model. Physiological
oscillations that affect the hemodynamics, such as pulse (1Hz)
and respiration (0.2Hz), are usually present in the EPI time-
series in the form of aliased higher-frequency components
expressed at lower frequencies due to undersampling at typical
TRs of 0.5Hz. The design matrix thus included a partition of
nuisance regressors that reflected pulse and respiration in the
form of their (theoretical) aliases and a partition modeling the
instantaneous effect of headmovement, its spin excitation history
and their 2nd-order expansions (Friston et al., 1996; Lund et al.,
2006).
FIGURE 2 | Response times (ms) to Social Truth-Ingroup, Social
Truth-Outgroup, Simple Truth-Ingroup, Simple Truth-Outgroup. The “+”
indicates a single outlier with respect to the upper quartile of the data.
Group Analysis
Linear contrast images were created for each subject testing for
the main effects and the interaction of the 2 × 2 experimental
conditions during the decision period when subjects responded
to the question. In order to make inferences at the population-
level, we performed random-effects analyses for the two main
effects and the interaction using one-sample t-tests. All statistical
tests were thresholded at p < 0.05, family-wise error (FWE)
whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons using Random
Field Theory (Worsley et al., 1996).
RESULTS
Behavioral Responses
When formulating a response to a social question, subjects
had significantly slower response times compared to simple
questions, t(66) = 13.5, p < 0.0001. There was no effect of In-
group > Out-group on reaction times, F(1, 66) = 0.04, p = 0.83,
nor was there an effect of the interaction, F(1, 66) = 0.08. p =
0.77. This behavioral finding supports the hypothesis that social
truth telling, like deception, is a more complex task than simple
truth telling, which places higher demands on executive functions
(Figure 2).
fMRI Results
The fMRI analysis focused on the short decision period following
a question to the point when subjects responded to either a social
or a simple truth question about an in-group fellow or an out-
group fellow (see Figure 1). In this way, we were able to isolate
the period during which participants decided how to respond,
controlling for the mere effects of finger movement. We found
a significant effect of social > simple truth telling in medial
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prefrontal cortex, bilateral anterior insula, inferior frontal cortex,
and the precuneus. Clusters with >100 contiguous voxels were
located in the ventral part of the medial prefrontal cortex with
peak at MNI: [0 58 4], t(22) = 12.55, p < 0.001, left anterior
insula with peak at MNI [−48 20 −8], t(22) = 9.78, p < 0.001,
right anterior insula with peak at MNI [48 24 −8], t(22) = 9.34,
p < 0.001, left supplementary motor area with peak at MNI [−6
18 64], t(22) = 10.71, p < 0.001 and the precuneus with peak
at MNI [2 −66 32], t(22) = 11.69, p < 0.001 (Figure 3). There
was no significant main effect of Ingroup > Outgroup, no effect
of simple truth, nor was there an effect of the interaction.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to use fMRI measures to investigate
the social-cognitive nuances of truth telling. This entailed testing
whether the cortical responses that mediate truth telling are
sensitive to social context and whether these responses are
affected by group identity. We hypothesized that social truth
telling, compared to simple truth telling, would engage brain
regions previously associated with social cognition. Specifically,
we anticipated activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (Amodio
and Frith, 2006) and the insula (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012).
This was based on the intuition that telling the truth, specifically
in a social context, requires predicting the mental point of
view of another person and empathizing in terms of predicting
the feelings of that person. We further hypothesized that these
processes would be pronounced when telling the truth about
in-group compared to out-group members.
In support of our first hypothesis, our findings show that
formulating a response to social questions increases activity
in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, and
precuneus, compared to formulating a response to simple
factual questions. Activation of these regions is accompanied
by significantly slower reaction times to social questions, both
during in-group and out-group conditions. This indicates that
being asked to tell the truth under conditions of potentially
adverse social outcomes, may be associated with response
inhibition, mediated by the anterior insula and prefrontal
network. This activation pattern is almost identical to the pattern
reported in well-controlled studies of deception. Such activation
has also been associated with increased activation of areas that
have been associated with mentalizing (Amodio and Frith,
2006), third-person perspective-taking (Vogeley et al., 2004), and
empathy (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012).
We did not find any support for the second hypothesis
concerning the in-group/out-group distinction in either the
behavioral data or the fMRI data. We used an in-group/out-
group paradigm because we hypothesized that this difference in
social context would modulate the effects of social truth telling.
While the hypothesized difference between in-group and out-
groupwas not expressed in reaction times, the neuronal processes
that mediate this contextual difference may have been too subtle
to be revealed with BOLD fMRI or may require more statistical
power, both within subjects and in terms of group sample size.
This null finding will have to be rejected or replicated in future
behavioral and neuroimaging studies.
In previous studies, the medial aspect of the prefrontal cortex
has been associated with theory of mind (Happé et al., 1996;
Adolphs, 2001), socially-complex, person-perceiving mentalizing
tasks (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Frith and Frith, 2006, 2012;
Frith, 2007), and inferring information about the emotional state
of another person (Ochsner et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2005;
Saxe and Powell, 2006; Krämer et al., 2010). Mitchell et al.
(2005) have proposed a simulation theory in which activity in
these regions may be associated with the prediction of others’
states based on a subject’s own experience (see also Lombardo
et al., 2010). Indeed, recent research has fine-tuned this account
to propose a spatial mentalizing gradient in this brain area,
associating the capacity to make judgments about self and
FIGURE 3 | Increased BOLD activity during social > simple truth telling overlaid on an anatomical MRI of a single subject in MNI space. Left: sagittal,
coronal, and axial sections centered on the medial prefrontal activation (dashed circle). Right: sagittal, coronal, and axial sections centered on the activation in bilateral
anterior insula and inferior frontal gyrus (dashed circles).
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others with a distributed gradient along the ventral to dorsal
parts of the medial prefrontal cortex (Denny et al., 2012). In
addition, Coricelli and Nagel (2009) showed that the medial
prefrontal cortex is recruited by individuals using high-level
reasoning (and expecting similar forms of reason from others)
in a competitive context, thus supporting our suggestion that
truth telling is associated with brain-areas related to complex and
socially-mediated high-level cognition, and not always suitable
as a control condition from which cognitively-taxing deception
conditions can be disaggregated. Thus, we suggest that in
conditions of socially-stressful truth telling, medial prefrontal
activity may encode effects of our own choices and actions onto
the thought and behavior of others. If Theory of Mind describes
the capacity to attribute mentality to another, empathy is the
ability to see a similarity between one’s own feelings and those of
another (Decety and Jackson, 2004). This distinction is important
for our study, where the design (participants assess others’ poor
performance, in the belief that they, too, will be the subjects
of others’ assessments) is sensitive to empathizing, in addition
to Theory of Mind. Activation found in the anterior insula of
our sample may also indicate feelings of empathy, and a sense
of fellow-feeling from participants who recognize that telling
an unpleasant social truth may have effects on another person,
(Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). In situations involving social truth
telling, the speaker must manage, not only information about the
question and content, but also the potential costs of revealing
truths about another person. It has also been suggested that the
medial prefrontal area is involved in planning for the future.
Frith and Frith (2006) suggest that activity in this area may be
involved in predicting how others will think and feel, and in
planning for the outcome of their experience of particular states.
Our results support the interpretation that being asked to tell the
truth requires an individual to take another person’s perspective
and to empathize in order to predict how others will think
and feel.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This study engages a new research area: socially stressful truth
telling. As such, it contains several important limitations, each
of which could be overcome in future experiments. First, while
our experimental design is counterbalanced for perceived gender
differences, there is a potential gender imbalance among our
participant group (27 participants, 21 females) that may have
affected the ingroup/outgroup dynamics. Our sample population
was chosen from local choir singers, who are statistically more
likely to be female (although choir singing remains a rare example
of a competitive group activity in which make and female
participants compete together). Future studies could include an
equal number of male and female participates in the study.
Second, because this study worked within a novel context of
“socially stressful truth,” we did not have statistically–validated
question sets from which to choose. To develop our question
set we ran a pilot study that consisted of a survey (completed
by participants with similar demographic profiles to the final
study participants) on the social-stress level of 40 questions,
from which we chose the 20 most stressful questions. Future
studies could benefit from our question bank and from more
validated research into the range of questions that subjects in a
particular group might identify as socially stressful. Third, we did
not test the level of honesty among participants while they were
undergoing scanning. We were interested in activation caused
by being asked to tell a socially stressful truth, not in activation
caused by telling a socially stressful truth. Nonetheless, follow-
up studies—particularly those that wish to focus on connections
between activations caused by lying and activations caused by
truth telling—would likely incorporate new sets of questions
that might be measured against a truth/deception scale and/or
incorporate a set of pre and post interview questionnaires
that would help to measure how truthful (or deceptive) the
participant perceived themselves to be during the experimental
scanning.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study indicate that “truth” is not a simple
or singular variable. We show that participants have slower
reaction times and differential activation of the medial prefrontal
cortex, anterior insula, and precuneus when asked to tell a social
truth. Future research is needed to characterize the neuronal
mechanisms that mediate various truth telling conditions, which
could range from simple truth to social truth and beyond. Future
studies might also take account of the potential neurobiological
overlap between truth and lie conditions, which may pose
a confounding effect on the isolation of either “truth” or
“deception.” Our data suggests that being asked to tell a social
truthmay bemediated by context; and that certain kinds of truths
are more consequential than other truths.
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